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Abstract 
Several “new” industries of the second industrial revolution were characterised by one, 
or few, “fundamental” patents, without which manufacture of a viable product was not 
practicable. The degree of monopoly control that such patents conveyed was mediated 
by national socio-legal regimes, encompassing both patent law and its interpretation 
and enforcement. Using four case-studies (two for the UK - a low anti-trust 
environment, and two for the USA - a high anti-trust environment) we show that 
fundamental patents were major determinants of monopoly power, industry structure, 
barriers to competition, and consumer prices. Impacts could extend beyond the life of 
the patents, owing to first mover advantages and path-dependent processes. Meanwhile 
national socio-legal environments, the nature of the fundamental patents, the strategies 
of the patent owners, and the nature of the specific product technology could have 
important (and sometimes unforeseen) consequences. 
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The period from around 1860 to 1914 saw the launch of a cluster of “new” industries, 
mainly based on the technologies of electricity, the internal combustion engine, and new 
developments in industrial chemistry. Several were characterised by one, or few, 
“fundamental” patents, without which manufacture of a viable product was not practicable. 
Such patents were of considerable importance to the development of many new industries of 
the “second industrial revolution”, including electrical goods and power, communications, 
sound recording, film, chemicals, bicycles, automobiles, and aircraft.1 This process was in turn 
mediated by national socio-legal regimes – encompassing patent law; the interpretation of the 
law by the courts; non-patent legislation or pressure (such as anti-trust law and nationalistic 
sentiment); and the ability of vested interests to sway the outcome of legal challenges – for 
instance through buying up the best legal expertise or having sufficient capital to engage in 
protracted litigation. Such factors could potentially lead to very different outcomes for the same 
companies in different jurisdictions. 
The importance of fundamental patents is emphasised in the literatures on patent law 
and competition policy, which note the growing importance and potential monopoly power 
implications of such patents, in the context of current new technologies such as biotech and 
semiconductors.2 It is also beginning to be explored in the economic history literature. For 
example, Christopher Beauchamp has shown how, during the second industrial revolution, 
courts and law suits moved to the centre of inter-firm relations in a range of new industries, 
influencing both the extent to which patents on basic innovations were interpreted narrowly or 
                                                          
 
1 C. Beauchamp, The Telephone Patents: Intellectual Property, Business, and the Law in the United States and 
Britain, 1876-1900, in: Enterprise & Society 9, 2008, pp. 591-601, p. 593. 
2 See, for example,  J.H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: a Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential 
Innovation, in: Antitrust Law Journal 65, 1997, pp. 449-66. 
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broadly and whether the potential for monopoly power inherent in patents was translated into 
real monopoly control.3 
In this article we explore the importance of fundamental patents to the development of 
the new industries of the early twentieth century. Using case-studies we show that fundamental 
patents were major determinants of monopoly power, industry structure, barriers to 
competition, and consumer prices, in these industries. Patent licensing agreements constituted 
powerful instruments of control, which could be used to influence not only costs, but prices, 
product characteristics, tied purchases, and the extent of inter-industry competition. Their 
impacts could extend beyond the life of the patents, owing to first mover advantages and path-
dependent processes. Meanwhile national socio-legal environments, the nature of the 
fundamental patents, the strategies of the patent owners, and the specific product technology 
could also have important (and sometimes unforeseen) consequences. 
We focus on two national cases, Britain and the USA. Britain had a particularly strong 
intellectual property regime, stemming from what Nigel Harris has characterised as a 
“liberal-conservative political economy” developed to serve what was primarily a financial 
and mercantile economic elite. Victorian Britain developed a consensus based around free 
trade, freedom of contract, and business self-regulation.4 This was reflected in court decisions 
that increasingly emphasised property rights and avoiding state `interference’ in private 
property; progressively marginalising an older tradition of British common law that was 
antagonistic to `restraints of trade’.5 Moreover, in contrast to the United States, Britain had no 
                                                          
3 Beauchamp, The Telephone Patents. 
4 T. Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America, 1880-1990, Cambridge 1992, p. 8. 
5 N. Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society.  British Conservatives, the State and Industry 1945-1964, 
London 1972, p. 25; L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy, London 1976, pp. 42-3. 
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anti-trust legislation to temper the potential welfare losses arising from the un-restricted 
exploitation of patent monopolies until after the Second World War.6 
  In contrast, American political economy increasingly reflected fears regarding 
potential abuses of monopoly power. The 1890 Sherman Anti-trust Act prohibited individual 
or collective actions aimed at creating monopoly positions. Toney Freyer has identified a 
trend from the 1890s for American courts to became more hostile towards anti-competitive 
agreements; in contrast to British courts, which were increasingly prepared to not only 
permit, but to enforce, such agreements.7 In 1914 the Federal Trade Commission Act and the 
Clayton Act substantially strengthened the effectiveness of U.S. anti-trust policy, by 
empowering the Trade Commission to investigate restrictive practices which might violate 
the Sherman Act and to enforce prohibitions against them.8 The inter-war period saw a 
general rise in anti-trust sentiment (though the priority given to anti-trust enforcement ebbed 
and flowed, according to the economic cycle and other factors), which further tempered the 
potential monopoly power of fundamental patent ownership, as discussed in the U.S radio 
case below.  
 This study examines two types of patents where the potential for control extends 
beyond the specific patented item. The first - `discrete’ patents - cover components which are 
essential to manufacturing viable products, but which are not the focus of cumulative 
                                                          
 
6 For a discussion of the interaction of patent and anti-trust legislation, see L. Kaplow, The Patent-antitrust 
Intersection: a Reappraisal, in: Harvard Law Review 97, 1984, pp. 1813-92;  M. A. Carrier, Unravelling the 
Patent-antitrust Paradox, in: University of Pennsyslvania Law Review 150, 2002, pp. 761-854. 
7  Freyer, Regulating Big Business, pp. 24 & 78-9. 
8 S.N. Broadberry/ N F.R. Crafts, Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s: Some Neglected Factors, in: The 
Journal of Economic History 52, 1992, pp. 531-558, p. 547. 
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innovation for those products. We explore one UK case, the carbon light bulb filament, and 
one U.S. case, the Kenney patent on using a narrow aperture of a larger tube to create a 
powerful vacuum. Both of these were introduced prior to the First World War, when U.S. 
anti-trust pressure was still relatively weak and both had the effect of restricting competition 
and raising prices (though differences in patent exploitation strategies led to the creation of a 
simple monopoly in the first case and an exclusive cartel in the second). 
 The next two cases involve fundamental patents which formed the base of a 
cumulative process of innovation, with improvements to the technology generally building 
directly on early patents (unlike, for example, the tungsten light filament, which displaced, 
rather than improved, the carbon filament). Such patents are common in many electro-
mechanical sectors, such as automobiles, aircraft, and, later, semiconductors and computer 
hardware and software. In such industries an uncompromising approach to prioritising patent 
rights is viewed as particularly problematic for post-patent innovation compared to an `open 
marketplace’ for improvements on initial patents. 9 We look at a technology that was 
commercially exploited from the early 1920s – entertainment radio in the USA and in the 
UK. Here differences in national intellectual property and anti-trust regimes are shown to 
have had fundamental impacts on costs and `rents’ in the sector – despite the fact that patent 
licenses were available to all complying manufacturers in both countries. 
 
The incandescent lightbulb 
 
Interest in incandescent lighting began in the early 19th century in Britain. The first British  
patent on an incandescent lamp was granted in 1841 to the Englishman Frederick De Moleyns. 
                                                          
9 Kaplow, The Patent-antitrust Intersection; Carrier, Unravelling the Patent-antitrust, pp. 829-31. 
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Then, in 1845, American inventor, J.W. Starr filed a British patent for an incandescent lamp 
composed of a carbon rod in a vacuum above a column of mercury. Two major technical 
problems - creating a vacuum in the lamp in order to extend the life of the incandescent material 
and securing a reliable source of electricity - were addressed in the 1860s and 1870s, leaving 
the development of a satisfactory illuminant as the last important obstacle to a commercially 
viable incandescent lightbulb. Experiments were conducted using various metals, and carbon 
proved the most suitable material because its melting point is higher than that of any metal and 
its resistance to electric current is appropriately high.10 
Sawyer and Man filed a U.S. patent for a “nitrogen-filled lamp employing a carbon rod 
as the illuminant” in January 1879, which their agent had earlier patented in England.11 Thomas 
Edison experimented with high-resistance carbon filament conductors, including carbonised 
cotton sewing thread, carbonised Bristol-board filaments, and bamboo filaments. His cotton 
thread patent (No. 223,898) proved to be the basic patent in the early American incandescent-
lamp industry. The innovative feature was a high-resistance carbon conductor illuminant in 
filamentary form, which had only been used in the unauthenticated Göbel lamp of 1854. The 
distinction between a carbon rod and a carbon filament provided the basis for Edison’s patent 
as well as for his commercial success.12  
                                                          
10 A. A. Bright, The Electric-Lamp Industry. Technological Change and Economic Development from 1800 to 
1947, New York 1949, pp. 35-41. 
11 Bright, The Electric-Lamp, pp. 51-52. 
12 Bright, The Electric-Lamp, p. 42; M. A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, in: Michigan Law Review 
110, 2012, pp. 709-760. 
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Edison followed a systematic policy of international patenting, using patents with broad 
claims, to maintain control over his inventions and block the entry of competitors.13 In 1879, 
in keeping with this strategy, Edison filed patents for his carbon filament and easily obtained a 
British patent – in contrast to the USA, where, after a five year struggle, Sawyer and Man 
managed to prove “priority of reduction to practice” for their incandescent lamps.14 However, 
in Britain Joseph Swan had been experimenting with the incandescence of carbonised paper 
coils in a vacuum since 1848 and resumed his experiments in the late 1870s, as the vacuum 
problem was now solved. Swan and his team managed to develop and demonstrate the first 
carbon-filament lamp between December 1878 and the early months of 1879, but did not file 
a patent until Swan became aware of Edison’s patenting.15 Meanwhile St. George Lane-Fox 
patented a process for creating a uniform resistance filament by carbonising a French grass 
fibre in 1879, which he sold to the Anglo-American Brush Electric Light Corporation.16 
The British Edison Company was established in 1882 to develop and control the British 
electric lighting market using the Edison patent. It commenced legal action against the Swan 
Company for patent infringement, but, mindful of Swan’s evidence of prior research and 
publication, switched to negotiating a merger deal that created the  Edison and Swan United 
Electric Lighting Company (later, the Edison and Swan Electric Lighting Company) to exploit 
Edison and Swan’s complementary patents, together with Gimingham’s British patent (UK 
                                                          
13 S. Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, in: 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 38, 2004, pp. 267-321. 
14 Bright, The Electric-Lamp. 
15 S. Arapostathis/G. Gooday, Patently Contestable. Electrical Technologies and Inventor Identities on Trial in 
Britain, Cambridge Mass. 2013, pp. 177-179. 
16 Bright, The Electric-Lamp, pp. 49-50. 
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4193, 1881) and the Cheesborough patent (1878).17 This created a monopoly position that 
lasted until Edison’s patent expired in 1893.18  
The newly established company protected its position through legal actions, in line with 
Edison’s strategy of ‘predatory patenting’. Between 1885 and 1901, the Edison Company filed 
over two hundred infringement suits and its expenses for litigation amounted to $2 million.19 
Among various British court cases, the actions brought against Woodhouse & Rawson in 1884 
and 1885, Holland in 1885, and subsequent appeals, were widely publicised. After the court’s 
decision to uphold Edison’s patents against Woodhouse & Rawson, it became apparent that the 
Edison and Swan Co. was trying to establish a monopoly. Manufacturers reacted by 
establishing a committee to monitor Edison and Swan, while unsuccessfully lobbying for 
Parliamentary intervention.20 
Edison and Swan also sued light bulb suppliers and users, including the manager of the 
Albert Palace at Battersea, for infringing their patents. The defendants attacked Edison’s patent 
on the grounds of its broad claims and insufficient disclosure of details.  After hearing expert 
witnesses and a moderator’s report, the judge decided in favour of Edison and Swan as far as 
the Cheesborough patent was concerned. However, he also concluded that the Edison patent 
was invalid because its claims were too broad and it did not disclose sufficient information 
about manufacturing a carbon filament. Edison and Swan appealed against the latter decision 
and, in 1889, won their appeal against Holland, Jablochkoff Electric Light & Power Company, 
and General Electricity Ltd, who had supplied the lamps, and against the Anglo-American 
                                                          
17 The Manchester Guardian, October 3rd 1883; Arapostathis/Gooday, Patently Contestable, p. 185. 
18 Arapostathis/Gooday, Patently Contestable, pp. 183-184. 
19 Sell, Intellectual Property, p.298. 
20 Chancery Division/1886/Volume 32/Edison and Swan Electric Light Company v. Woodhouse [1884. E. 89.] 
(1886) 32 Ch.D. 520; Incandescent Lamps, in: The Times, August 27th 1886, p. 3. 
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Brush Electric Light Company, the manufacturers of the lamps – who took up the defence. The 
judges of the Appeal case considered Edison’s filament patent as a “new departure in 
electricity, that the specification sufficiently describes and ascertains the nature of the 
invention.”21 
These legal victories gave Edison and Swan an effective monopoly, enabling them to 
charge very high prices during the lifetime of the patent.22 For example, a 16-candlepower 
lamp, priced at 3 shillings 9 pence in Britain, could be obtained in continental Europe for only 
1 shilling.23 Edison-Swan and Anglo-American Brush Electric became the major players in the 
British light-bulb industry, which by 1893, included only seven manufacturers. A large number 
of other concerns, 48 by 1893, confined themselves to arc lighting after the Edison and Swan 
v. Holland court case.  
[Figure 1 near here] 
The monopolistic position of the Edison and Swan Company ended with the expiry of 
Edison’s fundamental patent in 1893. Thereafter the number of light bulb manufacturers 
increased to 24 (see Figure 1), which was still well below the 51 manufacturers of arc lights. 
Bright mentions that 50 new brands, some of which foreign, were introduced in Britain between 
1893 and 1896. However, several newly-established manufacturers proved short-lived and 
                                                          
21 Incandescent Lamps, in: The Times, August 27th 1886; Edison and Swan United Electric Company v. Holland 
in: The Times, December 14th 1888; Law Report, February 18th 1989, Supreme Court of Judicature Court of 
Appeal Edison and Swan United Electric Light Company v. Holland, in: The Times, February 19th 1989; 
Arapostathis/Gooday, Patently Contestable, pp. 185-190; Bright, Electric-Lamp, p. 108. 
22 Electrician 17, 1886, p. 50, cited in Arapostathis/Gooday, Patently Contestable, p. 185; J. Swinburne, The 
Edison Filament Case, in: The Telegraphic Journal & Electrical Review, August 6th 1886, pp. 129-134. 
23 Bright, Electric-Lamp, p. 109. 
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Edison and Swan sustained its leading position, based on important continuing patents on lamp 
holdings and fittings, together with its strong brand and highly developed distribution system.24  
Competition led to price reductions; the prices of standard 8- and 32-candlepower 
lamps dropped to about a shilling, partly owing to cheaper German imports, which had been 
previously blocked from the British market by the patents and against which British firms 
struggled to compete.25 As a Parliamentary subcommittee noted, foreign industries that had 
been free from patent restrictions, as in Germany where the claims of Edison’s patents were 
narrower, had progressed more rapidly in terms of manufacture techniques and industry 
organisation.26 
High prices retarded the diffusion of electric lighting (and, therefore, electrification) in 
Britain, a problem compounded by The 1882 Electric Lighting Act. Designed to prevent a 
recurrence of earlier monopoly power abuse by gas supply companies, the Act empowered 
local authorities to purchase companies licensed to supply electric current and lighting, at a fair 
market value, within six months after 21 years from the date of the license. The risk of having 
to sell their investments at “asset value” after only 21 years acted to deter private investors, 
until the law was amended in 1888, extending the period to 42 years.27  
                                                          
24 Bright, Electric-lamp, p. 109. 
25 Profiteering Act, 1919, Findings and Decisions of a Sub-committee appointed by the Standing Committee on 
Trusts, to Enquire into the Existence of any Trust of Trade Combination in the Electric Lamp Industry, 1920, 
National Archives BT 55/55. 
26 Profiteering Act, 1919, Findings and Decisions; J. M. Rees, Trusts in British Industry 1914-1921. A Study of 
Recent Developments in Business Organisation, London 1922, p. 212; R. Cullis, What Makes a Successful 
Innovation? Four Inventions which Changed the World Economy, e-book 2008, p. 166. 
27 R. Fitzgerald, International Business and the Development of British Electrical Manufacturing, 1886–1929, 
in: Business History Review 91, 2017, pp. 31–70. 
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Even after the expiration of the Edison patent the sector continued to be characterised 
by restrictive practices, underpinned by patent control. The British Carbon Lamp Association 
was established by British manufacturers in 1905, to control the price of carbon filament lamps. 
This involved the creation of a patent pool, together with the acquisition of foreign patents 
including that for the ‘squirted tungsten filament’, granted to the Austrian inventors Alexander 
Just and Franz Hannan in 1904, for which General Electric Co. Ltd. succeeded in acquiring the 
British rights.28 Overlapping patents for the new Tungston filament technology risked costly 
litigation, which was avoided by the British Thomson-Houston Co. (the majority shareholder 
of which was the General Electric Company), the Osram Lamp Works Ltd (at the time a 
subsidiary of the General Electric Company specialised in tungsten-filament lamps) and later 
Siemens deciding to “come together, primarily on patents, each agreeing to recognise the 
others’ patents and to license the others for its own patents, and to interchange factory and 
laboratory experience”.29 The three corporations, together with Edison and Swan Electric Co., 
formed the Tungsten Lamp Association in 1912, creating a patent pool and agreeing to license 
their patents to other British lamp manufacturers – again with the objective of exerting control 
over the industry.30 The Tungsten Lamp Association was incorporated as the Electric Lamp 
Manufacturers’ Association of Great Britain, Ltd., in April 1919.31  
[Table 1 near here] 
                                                          
28 Standing Committee on Trusts, Fifth Meeting, January 13th 1920, National Archives BT 55/55; Profiteering 
Act, 1919, Electric Lamps, Finding and Decisions of a Sub-Committee Appointed by the Standing Committee 
on Trusts, Draft Report, National Archives BT 55/55; Bright, Electric-Lamp, p. 163. 
29 Standing Committee on Trusts, Fifth Meeting, January 13th 1920, National Archives BT 55/55; Bright, 
Electric-Lamp, p. 162. 
30 Arapostathis/Gooday, Patently Contestable, p. 194. 
31 Standing Committee on Trusts, Fifth Meeting, March 9th 1920, National Archives BT 55/55.  
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The cartel controlled 85 percent of British production just prior to the First World War, 
rising to 95 percent by the end of the War, and had succeeded in “protecting” the British market 
from overseas competition via its patent monopoly.32 Table 1 shows the higher prices imposed 
by the Association compared to non-Association manufacturers. Control was exerted through 
a system of incentives (discounts) and penalties (loss of discount and “blacklisting”) for 
distributors who sold bulbs produced outside the Association, together with other tactics aimed 
at reducing the competitive position of outsiders. The Association’s leading firms also used 
their patents to reduce competition from within the cartel, through restrictive patent licenses 
that limited the output of  licensees and stipulated that the validity of their patents should not 
be disputed.33 Thus Britain continued to face higher lighting prices, slowing the diffusion of 
electrification, into the 1920s. 
 
The vacuum cleaner 
The vacuum cleaner provides a classic example of a simple, “broad”, patent essential 
to the development of a viable product. Despite a variety of earlier patents, British fairground 
engineer Hubert Cecil Booth is generally credited with inventing the powered vacuum 
cleaner, in 1901, in the shape of a huge petrol-powered machine, pulled by horses.34 
However, the fundamental patent proved to be that of American inventor David T. Kenney a 
sanitary engineer, who had already successfully patented a toilet flush mechanism.35  In 
                                                          
32 Rees, Trusts, pp. 211-217; Arapostathis/Gooday, Patently Contestable, pp. 194-195. 
33 Profiteering Act, 1919, Findings and Decisions. 
34 C. Gantz, The Vacuum Cleaner. A History, Jefferson N.C. 2012, p. 35; J. Furnival, Suck, Don’t Blow, 
London, 1998, pp. 10-11.  
35 M. Robinson Sive, Vacuum Cleaners Before Electricity, in: Historical Text Archive,  
https://historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?action=read&artid=769 , accessed 12th March 2018.  
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November 1901 (nine months after Booth’s patent application), Kenney filed a U.S. patent 
for an `apparatus for removing dust’ which was granted in 1907 (#847,947, 19th March 1907), 
followed by further patents for refinements such as improved nozzles, cleaning tools for 
uneven surfaces, and a system for trapping the collected dust in water.36  Kenney’s 1901 
patent was the first to use a vacuum as the sole cleaning method, while Kenney avoided 
litigation with Booth by purchasing his U.S. patent application. This case-study focuses on 
the exploitation of the Kenney patent within the USA, as North America was one of the very 
few markets where a substantial vacuum cleaner industry emerged within the patent’s 
lifetime. 
Kenney’s original application covered the essential principle of all vacuum cleaners, 
the `narrow nozzle’ – sucking air through a narrow section of a broader tube to create a 
powerful vacuum that would draw in dirt. The patent-holding company, the Vacuum Cleaner 
Company of New York, was successful in having this patent held valid and infringed in 1907 
and by 1909 had given up manufacturing in favour of granting licenses to independent 
manufacturers.37 In 1911 four leading manufacturers formed a defence association to fight the 
Kenney patents. Following negotiations, in June 1912 they accepted Kenney licenses on a 2.5 
per cent royalty basis. This later evolved into a trade association, the Vacuum Cleaner 
Manufacturers Association (VCMA), with membership restricted to Kenney patent 
licensees.38  
                                                          
36 Robinson Sive, Vacuum Cleaners.  
37 Gantz, Vacuum Cleaner, pp. 49-52. 
38 Kenney license contract of 1912, reproduced in Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings 
Industry. Volume III: Kitchen Furnishings and Domestic Appliances, Washington 1925, p. 276. 
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The VCMA played a major role in determining the structure of the licensing system. 
Clause Seven of the Kenney license stated that the licensor would not grant further licenses 
without the consent of three quarters of existing licensees. The Kenney patents’ trustee 
explained the rationale to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as follows: `When the 
licensees got that contract they got it for the purpose of holding me down and keeping 
everybody out of the business.’39  Indeed it was the policing of this provision that was the 
VCMA’s principal function. Moreover clause 14 of the Kenney license stated that licenses 
were not assignable to other parties by the licensee, unless the firm in question was to take 
over its entire vacuum business.40 One immediate impact was that a Kenney license became a 
valuable asset. For example, Hoover Co. bought a Kenny license from the Vacuum Cleaner 
Company of New York, but was so concerned that this might be declared invalid (given that 
Clause Seven prohibited further licensing) that it went to the additional expense of buying out 
the Palm Vacuum Cleaner Co., who held an original Kenney license.41  
A similar situation arose in the U.S. automobile industry, where the Selden patent was 
successfully filed for a basic automobile configuration, using a lightweight internal 
combustion engine. Like the Kenney patent the key insight (in this case that a light, powerful, 
engine was critical to developing a viable automobile) was already known to others working 
in the field. Indeed the success of both patents may owe much to the fact that incumbent 
manufacturers supported them as vehicles to exclude further entry into the sector.42  
                                                          
39 Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings Industry, p. 7. 
40 Kenney license contract of 1912, reproduced in Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings 
Industry, p. 278. 
41 Gantz, The Vacuum Cleaner, pp. 66-67. 
42 R.P. Merges/R.R. Nelson, Market structure and technical advance: the role of patent scope decisions, pp. 185-
232, in: T.M. Jorde/D.J. Teece (Ed.), Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness, New York 1992, p. 205. 
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The Kenney licensing system, managed by the VCMA and the patent holder, fostered 
an industry structure based on very strong barriers to entry; high, relatively stable, prices; and 
a considerable degree of co-operation between member companies. By March 1924 (when 
the patent expired) there were 19 direct licensees and 6 sub-licensees, all of whom were 
VCMA members, encompassing all significant U.S. manufacturers.43 Restricting competition 
proved highly lucrative; the FTC found that profit rates for the vacuum cleaner sector were 
considerably higher than for ten other consumer durables’ sectors it examined, partly owing 
to the use of the Kenney patent to block market entry. Rates of return on initial investment in 
1920 were found to average 44.1 per cent, compared to rates for other household durables 
varying from 3.6 per cent (brooms) to 28.2 per cent (furniture); while in 1921 (a recession 
year) they were more than double that of the next most profitable sector.44 The FTC attributed 
vacuum manufacturers’ much larger profits to their ability to maintain prices, even during 
demand slumps.  
The VCMA encouraged co-operation between licensees, reflected in industry 
characteristics typical of cartels – including an emphasis on non-price competition. The 
system also fostered high levels of patenting by Kenney licensees, so that individual firms 
could trump proprietary features exclusive to their particular brand. By May 1922 firms in the 
sector collectively held over 275 patents.45  However, rather than being improvements to the 
Kenney patent, these typically involved other components of the vacuum cleaner, and – while 
some were important - none were fundamental to developing a commercially viable cleaner. 
For example, Hoover filed a patent in September 1910 – for `carpet agitation’ - via a motor-
                                                          
43 Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings Industry, p. xix; Gantz, Vacuum Cleaner, p. 92. 
44  Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings Industry, pp. xx-xxi & 18. 
45 VCMA minutes, 28th October 1921, cited in Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings 
Industry, pp. 10-11. 
17 
 
driven rotary brush that produced a beating action as it passed over the carpet.46 This gave 
Hoover a competitive advantage, through preventing other firms copying this particular 
system, until 1926.47  
The emphasis on patented `features’ as a source of firm-level product differentiation 
(often more important to marketing claims than to the basic functionality of the cleaner) may 
also explain why VCMA negotiations in 1921 to create a pool of its members’ patents – and 
thereby extend VCMA control beyond the lifetime of the Kenney patent, were unsuccessful 
(though anti-trust fears may have also been important). The VCMA did, however, continue 
after the Kenney patent expired, fostering co-operation in the standardisation of parts and 
accessories and the compilation of sales statistics.48 
The restriction of competition arising from the Kenney patent fostered a concentrated, 
collusive, industry, with an emphasis on non-price competition. For example the market 
leader, Hoover, had the highest list prices of any significant manufacturer, which were 
vigorously enforced.49  Table 2 shows costs and profits for 11 companies (including all 
significant manufacturers in the sector), for 1920 and 1921, classified by value of invested 
capital.50  Large firms appear to have used lower unit production costs to gain market share 
through lavish selling expenses (which rose from 6.3 per cent of net sales for the smallest 
class of firms to 25.7 per cent for the largest class in 1920).  Much of this money went on 
                                                          
46 Ibid, pp. 53-67. 
47 Ibid, p. 96. 
48 Ibid, pp. 9-14. 
49 Gantz, The Vacuum Cleaner, p. 98. 
50 VCMA minutes, 28th October 1921, cited in Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings 
Industry, p. 18. 
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raising and deploying armies of door-to-door salesmen, which constituted an expensive, but 
effective, means of promoting this new product.51   
[Table 2 near here] 
 The Kenney patent had enabled incumbent vacuum manufacturers to maintain control 
over their sector for several decades, via a licensing system that offered many of the barriers 
to entry advantages of trusts, without blatantly flouting what was, in other respects, relatively 
strong U.S. anti-trust legislation. The vacuum sector retained its stable and relatively 
concentrated industry structure (compared to most electrical consumer durables) until the late 
1930s and continued to be characterised by a high degree of price stability. Almost all the 
major U.S. vacuum cleaner manufacturers were founded during the lifetime of the Kenney 
patent (generally during its first decade) and by the time the patent expired they had 
developed strong first mover advantages, in terms of patents, cumulative investment in 
brands, and nationwide door-to-door sales forces, that were particularly important in a sector 
characterised by high consumer inertia and products that lent themselves to selling via 
demonstration. The main exception was Electrolux, which had developed similar proprietary 
assets in Sweden, that were transferred to the USA with the opening of a sales subsidiary in 
1924 (the year the Kenney patent expired) and a U.S. factory in 1933.52  
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Radio patents in a high anti-trust environment: the USA 
Industries such as electronics, motor vehicles, and aircraft (and, later, semiconductors 
and computer hardware and software) are typically subject to a process of cumulative 
technological advance, rather than the `discrete’, one-off, innovations that characterise much 
of the standard invention literature. They are also typically characterised by complex systems 
made up of many components, with technological progress taking place on a number of fronts 
simultaneously, within a common technological standard.53 Thus the holder of a fundamental 
patent on a component which is essential to producing a viable product is in a position to block 
innovations directly building on that patent, or those involving other components that cannot 
be used without the component covered by the fundamental patent.  
 “Broad” fundamental patents (with applications beyond a single narrow product) can 
thus influence the pace and nature of follow-on research, even potentially blocking such 
research. The holder of the narrower (`subservient’) patent cannot utilise their improvement 
without a license from the holder of the fundamental (`dominant’) patent. Similarly, the 
holder of the dominant patent cannot utilise the improvement claimed in the patent without a 
license from its owner.54 On the other hand they can be used to create potential monopoly 
positions over product categories, either for a single firm or through cross-licensing 
agreements that effectively exclude `outsiders’.55 We provide two case-studies for radio, 
covering the United States and Britain, to illustrate the crucial role of anti-trust policy in 
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mitigating the potential welfare losses arising from the monopoly power that control over 
fundamental patents can provide in these circumstances.    
Numerous individuals and firms contributed to the development of speech radio. The 
most important single innovator, however, was Guglielmo Marconi (1874-1937), an Italian 
who spent most of his working life in Britain. Marconi Co. established an American 
subsidiary in 1899, to lease equipment for maritime communications, and subsequently took 
out various U.S. patents, including for the `diode’ (the basic version of the thermionic tube, 
invented by Ambrose Fleming). The diode magnified radio signals using a two element 
thermionic tube, which was improved on in 1907 by Lee de Forest’s addition of a third 
element (the triode), making it a much more sensitive and powerful radio wave amplifier and 
detector. The triode proved the key component for clear radio reception and transmission, 
leading Western Electric (a subsidiary of American Telegraph & Telephone Co. (AT&T)) to 
purchase the patent, which they transformed into a much more powerful device through 
intensive R&D.56 
Subsequent innovation was hampered by patent litigation. For example in 1915 
Marconi sued de Forest, claiming that the triode infringed the diode patent. De Forest counter-
sued (as Marconi had added a third element to some of its tubes, infringing the triode patent), 
with the result that each party was found to have infringed the other.57 This effectively blocked 
the use of the triode pending successful negotiations. 
 Parchomovsky and Wagner have discussed how a portfolio of closely related patents 
can act as a “super patent”, conferring similar market power to that of a single broad 
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fundamental patent. This provides a variety of advantages, including reducing patent litigation 
(both defensively and as a potential infringer – for example by having credible counter-claims 
for infringement). Fundamental patents are of crucial importance to such portfolios, 
`anchoring’ the overall portfolio and often denying competitors access to elements that are vital 
to the creation of a viable device.58  
Following the predictions of this model, GE, AT&T, and Westinghouse engaged in a 
race to develop radio patents. Then in April 1917 America’s entry into the First World War led 
to a temporary moratorium on patent litigation, giving all parties freedom to innovate. The U.S. 
Navy thereafter sought to create a permanent solution to the domination of American wireless 
communications by a `foreign’ company (Marconi’s American subsidiary), which refused to 
sell its patented equipment outright, by unifying all U.S. radio patents in a single national 
champion. The Navy’s intervention led to the launch of Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 
as a sales company to market radios produced by the two main U.S.-based patent holders:  GE 
(producing 60 percent of its sets) and Westinghouse – who controlled the patents for two key 
radio circuits, the heterodyne and super-heterodyne - (40 per cent).59 Meanwhile AT&T gained 
protection for its monopoly position in telephone communications. Marconi also came out well 
from the deal, which involved an exchange of all patent rights between them and RCA, both 
for current patents and any future ones, up to 1945, giving Marconi access to a research stream 
that it would have found hard to replicate in its own laboratories. 60  
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RCA thus held a monopoly of both fundamental radio patents and of those improvement 
patents that could potentially block their transformation into practicable and efficient devices. 
These were to be exploited via its own sales monopoly in conjunction with a production 
monopoly for GE and Westinghouse. However, this combine failed to keep up with the 
explosive growth of demand for entertainment radio. The proportion of American households 
with radios rose from less than 1 per cent in 1922 to 16.0 per cent in 1926, and 45.8 per cent in 
1930.61 RCA produced insufficient sets to service this market, partly owing to delays in getting 
agreement on set specifications between RCA’s sales department and the two manufacturing 
companies. These problems proved so severe that some small firms that had obtained `amateur 
set’ licenses from Edwin Armstrong before he had sold his patents to Westinghouse were able 
to not only undercut RCA’s price structure but also beat them to the market with technical 
improvements (essentially minor innovations within the existing technological standard). 
Moreover, de Forest, who had retained a triode license for his own use, was able to sell 
triodes in competition with RCA following the termination of the diode patent in 1922. This 
enabled competitors to produce radios using circuits RCA did not control, particularly the 
neutrodyne. RCA sued for patent infringement, on the basis that the neutordyne was an 
improvement on RCA patented technology, but the case was not finally decided in its favour 
until 1927.62 RCA also faced continuing technical problems and product launch delays, 
including being forced to release their first superheterodyne radio late and with an unresolved 
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thermal-hiss problem; subsequent problems of factory quality control and engineering design; 
a consequent build-up of obsolescent stock; and delays in launching new models.63  
 RCA consequently gained less than a quarter of the receiver market during 1922-
27.64 Meanwhile judicial interpretations of America’s strong anti-trust legislation, designed to 
curb abuses of monopoly power, increasingly undermined RCA’s ability to leverage its 
monopoly position. For example, following the 1926 bankruptcy of one of RCA’s main 
competitors in the tube market, De Forest, the receiver in bankruptcy successfully sued RCA 
on the grounds that Clause Nine of its patent license contract, requiring all receiver licensees 
to buy tubes for their sets from RCA, violated the Clayton Act; a judgement which prompted 
further damage suits by independent tube markers. These were eventually settled in 
September 1931; RCA agreed to pay $1 million to the Deforest Co., and smaller amounts to 
some other litigants, in return for their acceptance of a 5 percent license fee (which might 
later be reduced to 2.5 percent).65 Some tube manufacturers were said to welcome this, as a 
means of “stabilising” the industry - another example of how patent licensing could be used 
to meet the objectives of incumbent licensees, as well at the patent holder.  
Moreover, a Federal Trade Commission investigation into RCA’s restrictive practices, 
together with the courts’ increasing willingness to view patent licensing as falling within the 
scope of anti-trust legislation,  and the adverse publicity and damage to relationships with the 
radio trade (including retailers) that this generated, progressively undermined the viability of 
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RCA’s production monopoly strategy.66 RCA therefore reluctantly agreed to offer patent 
licenses to receiver manufacturers from 1927, with royalties of  7.5 per cent of the set’s 
wholesale value. Meanwhile it extended its patent monopoly by requiring licensees to offer it 
an option on any radio patents they developed – thus effectively creating a pool of all new 
radio patents. 
RCA thus retained  a strong long-term position in radio patents and tube manufacture, 
while also being a leading radio components manufacturer.  These interests, together with 
broadcasting, that eventually became its most lucrative activity, became progressively more 
important than its role as a radio set manufacturer.  Moreover, RCA retained its overall 
dominance of the radio sector.  The U.S. Radio Manufacturers Association was widely 
regarded as a “tool” of RCA even in the late 1930s, given RCA control over the tube market 
and patents.67  
However, there were clear limits to the extent of RCA control.  The  changed 
environment of the 1930s (depression, technological maturity, and the onset of market 
saturation) witnessed rising market shares for new entrants such as Philco, Zenith, and 
Emerson, that focused on cost reduction and intensive marketing rather than technical 
innovation. Philco in particular aggressively gained market share through under-cutting 
competitors’ prices for radios of equivalent quality, becoming the dominant radio 
manufacturer of the 1930s.68 RCA also proved powerless to stop the introduction of a new, 
cheaper, and more compact radio format, the “midget radio”, which sold on price rather than 
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quality. This format was strongly opposed by established manufacturers, but retailers seized 
on it as an easy sale in a Depression market weighed down with surplus stock. Meanwhile 
manufacturers were unable to take co-ordinated action against retailers who stocked midget 
sets, without overtly flouting anti-trust legislation. 
America’s strong anti-trust regime (by contemporary standards), in conjunction with 
some loopholes in RCA’s control over fundamental patents, and its own production 
problems, had prevented RCA from establishing a monopoly position in radio set 
manufacture, or blocking the new midget radio format, which undermined the high-price, 
quality-based, competitive environment of the 1920s. This partly reflected the growing 
willingness of the courts to regard restrictive patent licensing as an anti-trust strategy 
(possibly influenced by the Federal Trade Commission’s success in demonstrating the 
widespread use of fundamental patents and patent pools as an anti-trust devices in the early 
1920s).69 Nevertheless RCA’s first-mover advantages in entertainment radio, stemming from 
its control over fundamental patents, were considerable - enabling RCA to dominate the 
markets for radio tubes, patent licensing, and the increasingly lucrative radio broadcasting 
market for many years after it relinquished its claim to a radio set production monopoly. 
  
Radio patents in a low anti-trust environment: the United Kingdom 
Marconi Co. had already developed or acquired most of the fundamental British radio 
patents prior to the advent of entertainment radio, capitalising on its ability to block patents 
that built on its initial innovations to leverage good purchase terms for improvement 
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patents.70  As a 1938 Marconi internal memorandum recalled, such agreements gave them 
rights to : 
the great majority of patents of importance in the radio field in our territory. Without 
these we would have been greatly hampered in our business and probably involved in 
costly litigation over the use of fundamental patents. In order to avoid infringing less 
important and supplementary patents we should have had to spend money on research 
and development for this purpose… a particularly expensive method.71 
For example, Armstrongs reaction patent, together with those for his superheterodyne 
and super-regenerative circuits, were acquired much more cheaply by Marconi than was the 
case for RCA, because these constituted developments on more basic patents that Marconi 
already owned.72 Such actions enabled Marconi to extent their dominance of UK radio 
patents beyond the lifetime of those patents that Marconi had actually generated through their 
own R&D activities. 
Buying out the entertainment rights of the other significant British patent-holder, 
British Thomson-Houston (BTH) consolidated Marconi’s position, while it obtained British 
rights to the patents generated by the dominant firms in the other principal radio 
manufacturing countries through the deal whereby American Marconi was sold to RCA, 
together with subsequent negotiations involving the dominant firms in the other principal 
radio manufacturing nations (which also gave them local rights over Marconi’s patents). 
These negotiations created an international patent cartel and, therefore, an international sales 
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cartel – as foreign sets did not have British patents and were thus excluded from the home 
market (Marconi only granted patent licenses to UK firms). This in turn provided Marconi 
with great leeway to charge high royalty fees to British manufacturers, as they faced no 
significant threat from cheaper imported sets.73  
Instead of seeking a production monopoly in radio, Marconi offered licenses to all 
British firms that agreed to comply with its conditions. This may have been influenced by the 
Post Office’s opposition to a commercial monopoly over British entertainment radio, 
especially in the hands of Guglielmo Marconi (who was considered a foreigner and did not 
enjoy good relations with the British government). It thus made approval of entertainment 
broadcasting contingent on the development of a framework which would avoid this.74  This 
proved fortuitous for Marconi Co., as its performance as a radio set manufacturer was even 
worse than that of RCA, incurring heavy cumulative losses owing to basic managerial 
errors.75 In 1928 Marconi ceased radio manufacture, selling its interests in receiver and tube 
production (and half the royalties of its patent pool) to EMI. 
The problem faced by Marconi in extracting the maximum `rent’ from its royalty 
monopoly has received significant discussion in the economics of vertical integration - 
usually modelled in terms of a monopolist supplying a component to a potentially 
competitive market of assembly manufacturers that might find ways of partially substituting 
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it with cheaper components not controlled by the monopolist.76 To prevent this, the 
monopolist can either extend its monopoly into direct assembly operations (as RCA 
attempted to do) or insist, as a condition of patenting, that no such substitution can take place. 
The latter strategy is regarded as more difficult, as it entails considerable monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Meanwhile costly innovations aimed at reducing the use of the monopoly 
input are predicted to lower the efficiency of the overall value chain.77  
Marconi tried to block innovation around its patents using a packaging license 
strategy. Manufacturers were obliged to license all Marconi’s 13 key patents, despite it being 
possible to produce a viable radio with only two of them.78 Licenses were granted to all 
British manufacturers who accepted Marconi’s conditions, with a standard royalty of 12s 6d 
per tube-socket (taken as a proxy for the set’s value).79 From the advent of broadcasting in 
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Britain in 1922, to around the end of 1926, Marconi had issued some 2,000 licenses to radio 
manufacturers.80 
Marconi’s licensing strategy proved very profitable. At the end of December 1920 its 
patents and patent rights were valued (at cost) at £280,417.81 The launch of the BBC led to 
Marconi’s royalty income jumping from £11,470 in 1922 to £60,861 in 1923, while data for 
subsequent years (restricted to Marconi radio patent pool receipts) show further rapid growth 
up to 1927, as shown in Figure 2. However, radio manufacturers found Marconi’s terms 
particularly onerous and sought ways to minimise patent costs. While it was impossible to 
directly innovate around Marconi’s patents, the form of the Maroni license - based on the 
number of tubes per set - enabled indirect innovation to minimise patent royalties by using 
fewer tubes to achieve the same functionality. Tube manufacturers first focused on increasing 
the amplification factor of each amplifying tube, then, in 1930s, began to develop multi-
functional tubes.82  
[Figure 2 near here] 
Such tubes were more complex and expensive to produce, raising prices substantially 
compared to the simpler, interchangeable, American tubes, which did not have to be 
manufactured to such close tolerances and were thus considerably cheaper.83 However, given 
that set-makers saved more money on royalties than they paid in higher tube costs, overall 
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costs were reduced.84 This contributed to an Anglo-American productivity gap in radio 
equipment that was large, even compared to other manufacturing sectors, though the British 
industry was shielded by formidable import barriers (exclusive patent rights and tariff 
protection).85 The premium on tubes with larger numbers of functions constituted a path-
dependent process of technical change and, while the `lock-in’ imposed by this process 
proved relatively weak, the complex, high cost, technical path of British tubes was only 
gradually undermined once the fundamental patents expired. Even in 1937 average unit 
values for exported British tubes were 220 percent higher than for tubes exported from the 
U.S.A. over 1935-7.86 
Marconi’s licensing strategy damaged relations with the radio equipment makers’ 
trade association, the (UK) Radio Manufacturers Association (hereafter RMA). British 
royalties were substantially higher than for other major radio manufacturing nations and 
encouraged home construction of kit radios, or manufacture by firms sufficiently small to 
evade royalties.87 Radio manufacturers also resented the fact that being forced to innovate 
around Marconi’s patent system markedly increased their production costs. Standard royalties 
on a three tube battery set rose from 7.5 percent of the average retail price in 1924 to 11.0 
percent in 1928. As the `retail price’ data on which this estimate is based include essentials 
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such as valves, batteries, and speakers - typically sold separately at this time – and retail 
prices were approximately double factory gate values, the impact on manufacturers’ costs 
was well in excess of 20 percent by 1928.88 
RMA lobbied for a much lower royalty, levied on the net selling price of the radio, at 
a basic rate of 5 per cent. Marconi’s rejection of any reduction led to a test case, after the 
Brownie Co. (whose two valve set was doubled in price by the Marconi royalty) approached 
the Comptroller-General of Patents in 1928 for a compulsory license for two of Marconi’s 13 
patents.89 Brownie alleged infringement of the Patents and Design Act, 1919, emphasising 
that Marconi refused to grant separate licenses for particular patents and levied royalties on 
all valve-sockets, even those that did not infringe Marconi patents. 
Judgement in the Brownie case was in line with Britain’s “liberal-conservative” 
political economy, prioritising private property rights over considerations of equity or 
competiton. In August 1928 the Comptroller-General found that Marconi’s royalties were 
unreasonable, but allowed Marconi to retain its package license system. Marconi then 
successfully appealed at the High Court, where Mr Justice Luxmoore ruled that Marconi was, 
`entitled to monopoly rights flowing from the ownership of patents it had acquired.’90 
Louis Kaplow’s “ratio test” evaluates the conflicting social welfare benefits of 
intellectual property rights, and unrestricted competition, using the ratio between the reward 
the patentee receives when permitted to use a particular restrictive practice and the monopoly 
loss resulting from such exploitation (licensing practices which generate higher ratios being 
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preferred).91 Viewed from this perspective, RCA’s licensing system was clearly superior to 
Marconi’s, as Marconi’s royalties were both markedly higher and encouraged expensive and 
inefficient innovation around their patents - a problem recognised in the intellectual property 
literature (justifying RCA’s practice of patent charges based on the price of the end product, 
even when not all components are subject to the patents).92 
The difference in cost structures is illustrated by comparison of  the value chains for 
typical UK and US household receivers in 1928, shown in Table 3. The British figure for 
manufacturing includes manufacturers’ advertising, though this is unlikely to significantly 
distort the comparison. In the UK patents accounted for 11 per cent of the total retail price, 
compared to only 4.1 percent in the USA. British tubes also comprised a significantly larger 
proportion of total set value, reflecting the bias towards fewer, more complex, tubes arising 
from Britain’s patent system. Extra costs attributable to patents and innovation around them 
thus amount to around 10 per cent of the retail price according to this measure.  
 [Table 3 near here] 
 Both the British and American radio sectors developed similarly fragmented 
structures, owing to very limited scale economies in an industry characterised by simple 
assembly methods, highly unpredictable demand, and rapid technical obsolescence.93 As 
Figure 3 shows, cumulative market shares (of unit sales) for the largest firms in each country 
were very similar. However, the welfare effects of the U.S. system were markedly superior. 
Effective anti-trust legislation increased the bargaining position of licensees and prevented 
                                                          
91 Kaplow / Carrier, Unravelling the Patent-antitrust, pp. 797-798. 
92 Kaplow, The patent-antitrust Intersection, pp. 1883-1884. 
93 See P. Scott, When Innovation Becomes Inefficient: Reexamining Britain's Radio Industry, in: Business 
History Review 88, 2014, pp. 497-521, pp. 502-507. 
33 
 
the blocking of lower-cost radio formats, such as the midget radio. Midget sets were largely     
responsible for a steep fall in average U.S. radio retail prices during the 1930s, from $133 in 
1929 to only $37 in 1934, with some midget radios selling for less than $10 by the late 
1930s.94 This episode of destructive “architectural innovation” (changing the configuration of 
the components of a product, rather than the components themselves) had undermined the 
established basis of competitive advantage in the U.S. industry, with three of the four largest 
American set-makers in 1929 no longer being significant manufacturers by the late 1930s.95 
However, this format was supressed in Britain by a trade boycott (which would have been 
illegal in the USA), together with vigorous patent litigation against importers of American 
midget radios.96 Britain nevertheless achieved rapid diffusion of domestic radios compared to 
most other nations, though that was largely due to the high-quality national radio 
programming provided by the BBC. 
 [Figure 3 near here] 
Conclusions 
 These four case-studies highlight the considerable potential for adverse welfare impacts 
from strong patent regimes, in the absence of strong anti-trust regimes. Britain  constituted an 
extreme case of a strong patent, weak anti-trust, environment. While most countries rejected 
the carbonised filament patent, Britain was prepared to grant it, resulting in a major rise in the 
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costs of electric lighting and a reduction in its diffusion – which delayed the spread of electricity 
supply, in turn retarding the diffusion of electrical machinery and appliances for domestic, 
commercial, and industrial use. Similarly in radio the cheaper midget format was supressed by 
a British trade boycott underpinned by patent litigation against non-complaint manufacturers 
or their retailers. This forms part of a broader cluster of negative technological and economic 
consequences arising from Britain’s liberal-conservative political economy of non-interference 
in private business (also demonstrated, for example, in a long delay in setting a mandatory 
standard voltage for mains electricity supply, compared to the USA), which significantly 
contributed to Britain’s loss of technological advantage during the second industrial revolution. 
 Prior to 1914 the U.S. also had an anti-trust regime which was largely ineffective in 
addressing monopolies and cartels created through the control of fundamental patents. Even 
in cases where the patent-holder did not wish to create a production monopoly, established 
firms in the sector could negotiate restrictive licensing arrangements designed to block entry 
– again raising prices and potentially slowing diffusion. The Kenney patent provides an 
illustration of this process, confirming the predictions of higher prices and `rents’. The impact 
on product diffusion is unclear, as high profits led the sector’s leading firms to invest heavily 
in direct salesforces - a particularly effective, but expensive, distribution method for new 
consumer durables.97 
 For technologies subject to cumulative innovation, the impact of patent restrictions per 
se appears less negative. As the U.S. and U.K radio cases have shown, the need to negotiate 
patent rights to basic or improvement innovations led to a system of international patent pools, 
where all the major radio-producing nations had access to each other’s patents.  However, the 
absence of a strong anti-trust environment to temper the monopoly features of patent pools is 
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again shown to produce markedly inferior outcomes. Britain’s patent license system involved 
much higher rents than the U.S. system, while also leading manufacturers to undertake 
expensive innovation to minimise patent costs, which was successful, but nevertheless 
substantially raised production costs. Meanwhile the persistent production problems 
experienced by both the RCA combine’s, and Marconi’s, direct radio manufacturing operations 
highlight the strong welfare losses that would have occurred if each firm had been allowed to 
act as a production monopolist.  
More generally, our research illustrates the potential for industry control through 
patents and the importance of examining this not only in terms of patenting law and litigation, 
but the interactions between the patent holder, industry incumbents, and new entrants. Patent 
licensing could be used not only to generate high rents, but to limit entry to the industry, tie 
component purchases to patent access, supress new product innovations (such as the midget 
radio) and impose price-fixing and market-sharing agreements. Moreover, even if the patent 
holder was uncertain about its legal position it was still possible to leverage a claim to a 
fundamental patent, by harassing manufacturers – or their distributors and retailers – with 
continued threats of litigation.98 Our research thus highlights the need for the monopoly 
power characteristics of patents to be tempered by effective legislation, not only to prevent 
monopoly production, but monopoly power, which can have strong negative welfare effects 
even in situations where licenses are granted to all firms that will accept the monopolist’s 
restrictive conditions. 
 
                                                          
98 Price-fixing and harassment of retailers with threats of litigation were tactics used, for example, in the U.S. 
washing machine sector, see U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the 
House Furnnishing Industry, pp. xxi & 26-30.  
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Table 1: Comparison of Net Prices Quoted to a Corporation for Standard Vacuum Wire Filament Lamps, High Volt (25 and 50 C.P.) by the 
Tungsten Lamp Association and five independent manufacturers 
 
 Association Non-Association 
 Retail price 
list 
Net Price Quoted A B C D E 
 s d s d s d s d s d s d s d 
1914 2 8 1 7.48 1 3.75 1 2 1 4 - - - - 
1915 2 8 1 9.76 1 3 1 2 1 4 - - - - 
1916 2 8 1 6.94 1 3 1 1.6 1 4 - - - - 
1917 3 0 1 5.52 1 3 1 1.8 1 1 - - - - 
1918 3 6 2 6.24 - - 2 1.2 - - - - - - 
1919 3 6 2 3.46 - - 2 1 2 1 1 11 1 111/2 
Jan., 1920 3 6 2 3.46 - - 2 1 1 11.8 1 11 2 1 
 
Source: Profiteering Act, 1919, Findings and Decisions of a Sub-committee appointed by the Standing Committee on Trusts, to Enquire into the 
Existence of any Trust of Trade Combination in the Electric Lamp Industry, 1920 
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Table 2: Costs and profits for eleven vacuum cleaner manufacturers providing data to the Federal Trade Commission for 1920 and 1921 
Investment size No. of 
firms
Average 
net sales
   Percentage of net sales accounted for by:
1920
Factory 
cost of 
goods 
Selling 
expense
General 
admin. 
expense
Total 
costs
Profit on 
goods 
sold
Net 
deduct-
ions
Net 
profit
Total
Over $1milion 3 6,288,643 52.9 25.7 8.3 86.9 13.1 1.2 11.9 100.0
$500,000 - $1 million 4 3,087,113 72.3 11.9 6.4 90.6 9.4 2.9 6.5 100.0
Under $500,000 4 987,374   74.0 6.3 6.0 86.3 13.7 1.7 12.0 100.0
Total 11 3,196,716 62.1 18.7 7.4 88.1 11.9 1.9 10.0 100.0
1921
Over $1milion 3 3,631,861 45.1 29.4 12.7 87.1 12.9 0.6 12.2 100.0
$500,000 - $1 million 4 2,337,044 65.9 16.2 8.0 90.1 9.9 3.4 6.5 100.0
Under $500,000 4 594,496   66.0 6.6 9.2 81.8 18.2 3.7 14.6 100.0
Total 11 2,056,522 55.9 21.6 10.4 87.8 12.2 2.1 10.1 100.0  
Source: Federal Trade Commission, Report on the House Furnishings Industry. Volume III: Kitchen Furnishings and Domestic Appliances, 
Washington 1925, p. 305. 
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Table 3: The value chains for typical American, and British, radio sets in 1928 (percent of retail price). 
Stages of value chain USA UK
Patents 4.1 11
Manufacture* 31.9 32
Tubes 9.0 12
Advertising & distribution 55.0 45
Total 100 100  
Sources and notes: see Peter Scott, The Market Makers. Creating Mass Markets for Consumer Durables in Inter-war Britain, Oxford 2017, pp. 
111 and 159. 
 
* UK figure includes manufacturers’ advertising. 
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Figure 1: Number of producers of incandescent Lamps, in Britain, the USA, France, and Germany, 1889-1896 
 
Source: A. A. Bright, The Electric-Lamp Industry. Technological Change and Economic Development from 1800 to 1947, New York 1949, p. 487. 
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Figure 2: Gross revenue patent pool revenue for radio broadcast receivers and related apparatus, 1923-32 
 
 
Source, Marconi 418. Marconi undated internal memorandum, n.d., c. 1938, by W. Nicken.  
Notes: before deduction of management expenses, bad debts, etc. From 1929 onwards theincome was divided equally between Marconi and EMI. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative market shares (units sold) for the largest radio manufacturers in the USA (1940) and UK (1938) 
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Sources: USA, W.R. Maclauren, Invention & Innovation in the Radio Industry, New York 1949, p. 146; UK - MMSI, Ferranti collection, 
1996.10/1/7/409, printed statement of R.M.A. radio data for year ending 31st Dec. 1938, n.d., c. 1939.  
